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The Employer and the Law of Privacy in the
Workplace-The U.S. Model to Date
by Arthur P. Menard*
and Anne K. Morrill**
"An American has no sense of privacy. He does not know what it
means." Shaw.
If George Bernard Shaw could see America fifty years later, he
would have to publish an immediate retraction. Indeed, in the last two
decades, employers have been beset by a bewildering plethora of laws
pertaining to privacy rights of employees. These laws relate to personnel
files, medical records, arrest records, eavesdropping, employment appli-
cations, blacklisting, and even fingerprinting. The laws also concern the
acquisition, retention and dissemination of employee information. Al-
though it is basically state laws which affect private employers, federal
law cannot be wholly ignored, particularly the Fair Credit and Report-
ing Act. Moreover, there must be a recognition of the impact of common
law.
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of these laws as
they affect the employer. Thus, this analysis will highlight pertinent
state law, as well as federal and common law which significantly affects
the private-sector employer. Although their relevance cannot be wholly
ignored, federal and state constitutional law, and other federal laws (e.g.,
the Freedom of Information Act and The Privacy Act of 1974) will not
be discussed.
One conclusion flowing from this examination of the laws of privacy
as they affect the workplace is that the internal adoption of fair privacy
and information practices by private companies may be both a well-
guided labor relations decision and a defense to potential common law or
even arbitral causes of action.
I. Overview of Right to Privacy Sources
To develop the primary focus of this analysis, namely, the relation-
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ship of privacy law to employment from a management perspective, it is
necessary to examine the legal framework within which privacy law has
evolved.
One aspect of the privacy concept is "informational privacy," a tri-
angular configuration composed of the individual, the government, and
the employer, which must be distinguished from that aspect of personal
privacy which is termed "autonomy."' An individual's interest in infor-
mational privacy encompasses the manner in which the government
gathers and uses personal information, as well as the impact the disclo-
sure of such information to third parties has upon him. 2 Concomitantly,
the employer must be aware of individual concerns and the protection
which the law affords an employee, in order to know what governmental
information is legitimately available to it and the purposes to which it
legally can be put.
Apart from access to data from governmental entities, an employer
must inform itself of information which legitimately is available to it
from non-governmental sources. The employer must look to the follow-
ing catalogue of laws: the federal constitution, some state constitutions,
numerous federal and state laws, and the common law of most of the fifty
states.
II. The Common Law Right of Privacy
Recent cases discuss and sometimes give cognizance to the rights of
individuals to exert some control over personal information, as well as
the duty of the government to protect individuals' rights. Additionally,
the cases discuss the duty of an entity, including an employer, not to
disclose certain information, or to disclose it only under controlled cir-
cumstances. This latter duty carries with it the reciprocal right of pri-
vate employers to have access to, and to utilize, various kinds of
information. These cases are usually tort actions brought under the com-
mon law of the several states.
In 1960, Dean Prosser re-examined the law of privacy as it had
evolved to that time3 and determined that no independent privacy right
existed. Rather, he found four distinct torts, that is, "four distinct kinds
of invasion of four interests." He classified these as:4
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs;
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff;
I Mitau, Toward a Comprehensiwe Fair Information Standards Law: A Commentary on the Data
PrWacy Issue in Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 649, 653-654 (1978). [hereinafter cited as Data
pi~vaiy I.
2 Id.
3 Prosser, %vacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
4 Id. at 389.
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3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye;
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.
Cases involving public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,
Prosser's second category, have been analyzed for the relevance of this
common law tort to an employee's challenge to a company's right to
disseminate personal and medical files.5 To prove the tort of public dis-
closure of embarrassing private facts, an injured party must show6 that
publicity was given to matters concerning his private life, the publication
of which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities, and that the matter publicized is not of legitimate public
concern.
A. Publicity
The "publicity" requirement must be distinguished from the term
"publication," as the latter is used in libel actions. 7 The disclosure of
information, even to fairly large groups, does not necessarily constitute a
sufficient amount of "publicity" for a valid invasion of privacy cause of
action, while "publication" includes any communication to a third per-
son. The publicity argument may serve as a shield for any employer who
has supplied information which is subsequently disclosed but not "publi-
cized." An employer should ascertain before disclosure, however, the
uses to which information is to be put, as well as its accuracy, and should
attempt to place limitations on subsequent uses of the information.8
B. Private Facts
The concern for possible employer liability for disclosure of informa-
tion has implications with regard to a company's access to information.
Thus, while some information, such as age and number of children, is a
5 W. CONNOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY, 475-505 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A PRACTICAL GUIDE]. The authors conclude
that the torts of "intrusion," "appropriation" and "false light" would be available only in lim-
ited circumstances, e.g., where an employer carried out unreasonable surveillance of an em-
ployee or inquired into his or her private affairs, causing mental stress, shame or humiliation to
persons of "ordinary sensibilities;" where an employer used an employee's name or picture with-
out his or her consent and for a commercial purpose; or where an employer publicized employee
records containing serious error and such action was taken with knowledge of the falsity or
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the information. Id. at 479-80. To the extent that
a cause of action might arise in these contexts, Greguras, Torts - Informational Privacy and the
Private Sector, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 313, 324-25 (1977), suggests that employers obtain release
forms to guard against or minimize the possibility of being found liable for "appropriation;"
and use reasonable care, ie. tailor their activities to a negligence standard, in the collection and
dissemination of information, which could place individuals in a "false light." Id at 319-20,
326.
6 See A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 481-85.
7 The tort of defamation has been characterized as a significant legal control over the use
of personal information. Greguras, supra note 5, at 315.
8 A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 483-84.
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matter of public record and, therefore, not protected, the employer
should take care to remain within the parameters discussed under the
publicity argument above. A plaintiff must be identifiable from a publi-
cation in order to prevail in a privacy action. Therefore, release of, or
access to, an information profile from which an individual's identity
could not be detected would not expose an employer or other supplier of
information to liability.
C Reasonableness
Publicity will not be found actionable unless it is determined that a
person of usual or ordinary sensibilities would be offended by it. Thus,
some information contained in personnel records "may be considered so
innocuous as to not cause embarrassment to a normal, reasonable
person."9
D. Defenses
Business necessity may provide a qualified defense to management
under certain circumstances, 10 as may consent, whether express or im-
plied."i Analysis of decisions construing these defenses suggests that an
employer may successfully argue that it has qualified privilege to dissem-
inate employee medical or other records to those outside the company if
business necessity warrants the disclosure. 12 A defense based on consent,
however, may be more tenuous since, in the absence of employee knowl-
edge of and acquiescence in such use, it is unclear whether a court would
be persuaded that consent had been given. 13
9 Id at 485.
l0 Under the tort of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, employers have carved
out a qualified privilege to respond in good faith to questions asked by unions and prospective
employers inquiring into reasons for an employee's discharge. See Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores,
208 Kan. 909, 921, 4,4 P.2d 1063 (1972) (report to union of disciplinary action taken by em-
ployer against union member engenders a qualified privilege: "It is well recognized that a com-
munication pertaining to the reasons for discharge of a former employee is qualifiedly privileged
if made in good faith by a person having a duty in the premises to one who has a similar interest
therein." But, imputations made by an employer of employee dishonesty or unethical practices
are libelousper se.). Under the tort of intrusion into seclusion, qualified privilege exists and will
protect employers who investigate employees claiming job-related injuries. See McLain v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 271 Ore. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975). (Employer not liable for privacy invasion
when it hired detectives to investigate the validity of an employee's workman's compensation
claim). See generally cases cited at A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 486.
1 The privacy right may be waived and if waiver is found, it will bar the tort action. A
PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 488.
12 See id. at 487.
13 A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 489. But see Comment, Employee Privacy Rights A
Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 162 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Employee Privacy Rights]
(The author asserts that even without express consent an employee may be found to have con-
sented implicitly to disclosure by voluntarily supplying information to an employer, or by fail-
ing to object to collection of information from third parties.). It would seem, however, that a
cogent argument could be made that employees, who have traditionally been perceived as pos-
sessing inferior bargaining power when compared to that of their employer, have not in fact
"voluntarily" given over information. Caution, therefore seems warranted.
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Beyond this, it has been suggested that business organizations in the
private sector use release forms to minimize potential liability vis a vis
their employees.' 4 If this is impractical, the accuracy of facts to be dis-
seminated becomes even more important. Accuracy, however, is not dis-
positive. Recent developments in the law of defamation suggest that "a
private figure has a greater range of private facts than a public figure.'
5
As such, a private figure may have more privacy protection. In the end,
however, insurance may be the most dependable answer to minimizing
liability. 16
At least one commentator has observed that information developed
independently by an employer, such as a performance evaluation, would
not be regarded as private and thus its disclosure would not be tortious.t
7
"Information about the plaintiff which was already known to others
could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff."' 8 That author has
concluded that while the theories of the common law privacy right afford
valuable protection to society as a whole, they have little, if any, applica-
tion to the employment relationship in terms of granting employees pro-
tection.'9 The obverse of this would seem to be that employers have
attained such protection under common law privacy right causes of ac-
tion. In fact, case law is not sufficiently developed to be definitive on the
question.
E Physicians' Confidential Duty
It has been argued that, apart from privacy actions, employees
could conceivably sue their employers for breach of the confidential rela-
tionship between a physician and patient if the company released medi-
cal files compiled by company doctors.20 Traditionally, however, case
law has found the physician-patient privilege inapplicable in the context
of the employment situation. 21
F Terminability at Will
Another related common law concept, the right of an employer "to
discharge an employee for any reason or no reason in the absence of an
agreement to retain him for a specified period of time," 22 is implicated to
14 Greguras, supra note 5, at 329-30.
15 Id at 330.
16 Id
17 Employee Privacy Rtghls, supra note 13, at 162.
18 Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 569, 255 N.E.2d 765, 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d
647, 654 (1970).
'9 Employee Prtivacy Rights, supra note 1, at 163.
20 A PRACrICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 491.
21 Company doctors have been found to owe no confidential duty to employees. See, e.g.,
Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Mracheck v.
Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954); Jones v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co.,
118 Minn. 217, 136 N.W. 741 (1912).
22 Employee Privacy Rights, supra note 13, at 158.
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the extent that "terminability at will" permits an employer to fire any
employee who objects to the employer's collection and use of information
about him.23 Thus, it has been argued that an employer may actually
collect and use information with virtually no constraint. 24 In fact, this
practice has come under increasing attack, and employers may not have
the latitude that the terminability at will concept implies.25
III. Federal Statutory Law
Federal legislation has imposed restraints on the use of information
in the private sector as well as the public sector. The Fair Credit Report-
ing Act (FCRA),26 has been called "the most important federal effort to
regulate privacy-invading activities in the private sector."'27 The FCRA
is germane to a consideration of privacy concerns within the workplace
because credit agencies frequently distribute their reports to employers,
who can use them to make employment decisions. By definition, a "con-
sumer report" allows the employer access to pertinent information. The
term refers to any written, oral, or other communication of information
by a consumer reporting agency concerning a consumer's credit worthi-
ness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, per-
sonal characteristics or mode of living, which is used or collected as a
factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for, among other things,
employment purposes. 28
Once an employer has requested consumer report information, and,
as a result, takes adverse action in an employment decision which is
based either wholly or in part on such information, the employer must
inform the prospective employee of the adverse action and must supply
the name and address of the consumer reporting agency that made the
report. 29 An individual may, at that point, request the "nature and sub-
23 Id
24 Id. at 159.
25 See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge, 93 HARVARD L.
REV. 1816 (1980) (The rule is flawed because it does not consider that if an employer and
prospective employee had adequate information about the proposed relationship, and truly ne-
gotiated a contract, job security would be one of the key terms bargained for.). There is some
case law support for this position. See,e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316
A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (bad faith termination of an "at will" employee breached the employment
contract). But see Howard v. Dorr Wollen Co., 120 N.H. 295 (1980) (Monge applies only to a
situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy
would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn); Cloutier v. Great
Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. S. Ct. 1981) (plaintiff in wrongful discharge case
must show that the defendant was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation and that he
performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do something that public
policy would encourage, or refused to do something that public policy would condemn; nonstat-
utory public policies may be actionable; the existence of a public policy sufficient to give rise to
wrongful discharge action is a jury question).
26 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)-(t) (1982)).
27 Employee Privay Rights, supra note 13, at 164.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1982).
29 Id. § 1681m(a). No corresponding right exists where an employer makes a favorable
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stance" of most of the information about himself or herself, including the
sources of the information.3 0 The individual may take steps to challenge
any item in the file and to have it reinvestigated.
The FCRA further provides that a consumer report may not include
obsolete information. 3' Thus, bankruptcies more than ten years old at
the time of the report, suits or judgments, delinquent accounts, paid tax
liens and information concerning arrests, indictments, or convictions
more than seven years old at the time of the report, cannot be reported;
nor can any adverse information which is more than seven years old at
the time of the report. None of these strictures applies, however, if the
subject of the report is applying for a job at an annual salary of $20,000
or more.
3 2
Finally, an employer may request a more thorough report which
will encompass the interviewing of neighbors, friends or associates of the
subject. This type of request triggers a requirement that the individual
who is the subject of the report be notified, though no such notification
must be given when the report is being prepared to evaluate an individ-
ual for a job.3 3
Goodnough v. Alexander's, Inc. 34 indicates that the limitations on disclo-
sure of obsolete information will be strictly construed. In that case an
employer discharged a seventeen-year-old department store clerk when it
learned from a credit report that the employee had been accused of shop-
lifting when she was twelve years old. 35 Because this information was
less than seven years old and, therefore, not obsolete under FCRA stan-
dards, the credit agency was found to have an absolute right to report
it.36 The court, while noting the department store's "moral abdication"
in using such information, further observed that there was no law to pre-
vent it.3 7 Moreover, the employee was found to have no remedy against
the employer because she was employed "at will;" such may no longer be
the case, of course, depending upon the state in which the case is heard.3 ,
Another case dealing with the reporting of information stored in a
decision, e.g., a job offer; thus, an employer has no obligation to disclose where no adverse use of
the information occurs. See Employee Orivacy Rights, supra note 13, at 165, n.67.
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g(a)(l)-(2) (1982). However, sources for the more comprehensive in-
vestigative consumer report need not be. disclosed. Id. § 1681g(a)(2). In this connection, it
should be noted that the FCRA recognizes a distinction commonly made between "credit
bureaus" and "credit reporting bureaus." It does so not by using these terms, but by distin-
guishing between "consumer reports" in § 1681a(d) and "investigative consumer reports" in
§ 1681a(e).
31 15 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1982).
32 Id § 1681c(b)(3). Section 605(b) of the proposed Fair Financial Information Financial
Practices Act, Title I Privacy Protection Amendments of 1979, H.R. 559, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) would raise the $20,000 figure to $40,000.
3 15 U.S.C. § 1681d (1982).
34 82 Misc. 2d 662, 370 N.Y.S.2d 388 (S. Ct. 1975).
35 Id. at 370 N.Y.S.2d 388 (S. Ct. 1975).
36 Id. at 390.
37 Id. at 391.
38 See supra note 25.
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credit agency's report is Peller v. Retail Credit Co. 39 In Reller the plaintiff
was rejected for employmemt when the results of a lie detector test re-
quired by the company indicated that the plaintiff had previously
smoked marijuana. 40 A second company subsequently hired the plain-
tiff, but dismissed him from employment when the new employer ob-
tained a copy of plaintiff's credit report and discovered the marijuana
use. The plaintiff's suit against the first employer and administrator of
the lie detector test, alleging invasions of privacy and violations of the
FCRA, was dismissed. The court first found that neither the employer
nor the test administrator were consumer reporting agencies and, thus,
they were not governed by the FCRA's provisions.4 1 The court also
found that because the FCRA forbids invasion of privacy suits based on
information obtained under its provisions unless a showing of malice can
be made, the plaintiff's claims did not fall within the protection of the
Act. 42 The minimal requirements imposed on users of credit reports did
not warrant any action against the second employer who had obtained
the report and dismissed the plaintiff.
As the above cases illustrate, despite the characterization of the
FCRA as the most important federal effort to regulate privacy-invading
activities in the private sector, much latitude remains for employers who
utilize information obtained in credit reports.
IV. State Statutory Law
A. State Consumer Report LegiWation
At least eleven states have enacted legislation concerning consumer
reporting agencies. 43 With the exception of Texas and New Mexico, the
law of the remaining states very closely resembles the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act,44 discussed above. A consumer reporting agency may le-
gally furnish reports to a person whom the agency has reason to believe
will use the information for employment purposes. Ten states specifi-
cally provide for this use in language which often tracks the federal law
verbatim. 45 While these laws differ in some details, from an employer's
39 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973), a fdmem., 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974).
40 Id at 1236.
41 Id. at 1236-37.
42 Id. at 1236.
43 Arizona [ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1696 (West Supp. 1983-1984)]; California [CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1786 (West Supp. 1983)]; Kansas [KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-701 to 722 (1976)1;
Maine [ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 0, §§ 1311 to 1328 (1964 & Supp. 1982-1983)]; Maryland
(MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-1110 to 1218 (1983)]; Massachusetts [MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 93, §§ 50 to 68 (West 1932 & Supp. 1983)]; Montana [MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-101
to 153 (1983)]; New Mexico [N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to 8 (1978)]; New Hampshire [N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:1 to :21 (Supp. 1981)]; New York [N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 380 to
380-s (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)]; and Texas [TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9016 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983)].
44 Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (1970); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
9016 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to 8 (1978).
45 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1692(3)(b) (West Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. CIV. CODE
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perspective they are significant because they allow the employer to use
information contained in a consumer report for purposes of evaluating a
consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an
employee. Since the latitude available to consumer reporting agencies in
collecting information is wide, their reports are an important source of
information about prospective or current employees.
Certain information, however, is inadmissible for purposes of pre-
paring the report. For example, New Hampshire4 6 specifically prohibits
the use, with .certain exceptions, of information concerning bankruptcies
more than fourteen years from the date of the report, and'of information
concerning suits, judgments, paid tax liens, accounts placed for collection
or charged to profit and loss, records of arrest or conviction of crime and
any other "adverse information" more than seven years old. These
prohibitions are not honored in the case of a consumer credit report to be
used in connection with the employment of any individual at an annual
salary of twenty thousand dollars or more.
B. State Law Concerning Medical Records
Employers must be concerned about laws governing medical records
from two perspectives: that of a requester of information and that of
possessor of medical information of which state law might require disclo-
sure. An initial source to check concerning information requests is the
state's fair credit reporting act, if one exists. New Hampshire's Act, for
example, defines "medical information" as information or records ob-
tained, with the consent of the individual to whom it relates, from a li-
censed physician, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic or other medical
or medically related facility. 47 Since the only prohibition on disclosure
of medical information seems to apply to the consumer, medical informa-
tion appears to be available to the employer to the extent a consumer
reporting agency has access to it.
Beyond this source and apart from medical information generated
in the course of an employment physical examination, 48 the traditional
doctor-patient privilege, statutorily protected in virtually every state,
would appear to bar an employer's access to medical information in most
instances. New Hampshire,49 for example, makes confidential the rela-
tions and communications between a physician, surgeon or psychologist
§ 1786.12(d)(1) (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1313(3)(b) (1964 & Supp.
1982-1983); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1202(3)(ii) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93,
§ 51(3)(b) (West 1932); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-111(3)(b) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-
4(A) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-B:1(I)(c)(2) (Supp. 1981); and N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 380-b(c)(3)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
46 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-B:5 (Supp. 1981).
47 Id. at § 359-B:3(IX) (Supp. 1981).
48 Company physicians have been found to owe no confidential duty to employees. See
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
49 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:26 & 330-A:19 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
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and his or her patient. Such communications are given the same protec-
tion as the attorney-client privilege.
A number of states50 have passed, or are considering, legislation
which permits an employee or a designated physician, to inspect the em-
ployee's medical record in the possession of an employer.
C State Laws Governhng Personnel File Data
Laws pertaining to the use and dissemination of information con-
tained in employer-controlled personnel files govern employee access to
the files, and in some instances, the sharing of file data with third parties.
Laws in California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, Mich-
igan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin51 deal with this issue.
In some cases the law covers only public employees; in other cases it af-
fects employees in the private sector as well, sometimes treating them
differently from public employees. While North Carolina law specifi-
cally provides that the personnel files of state employees shall not be sub-
ject to inspection and examination, 52 all other state laws allow access by
employees, upon their request, to their personnel files, usually at reason-
able times and at reasonable intervals.
Personnel files have been defined as those papers, documents and
reports relating to a particular employee which have been used to deter-
mine eligibility for employment, promotion, additional compensation,
transfer, termination and disciplinary or other adverse personnel ac-
tion. 53 The term "personnel file" does not, however, necessarily include
stock option or management bonus plan records, medical records, refer-
ence letters, materials used by an employer to plan future operations,
information in a separately maintained security file, test information, or
documents being developed for use in civil, criminal or grievance proce-
dures. 54 Some statutes are more cursory in their definition of personnel
file, and merely refer to those files "which are used or have been used to
determine [an] employee's qualifications for employment, promotion, ad-
ditional compensation or termination or other disciplinary action." 55
This definition does exclude, however, employee records relating to the
investigation of a possible criminal offense and letters of reference. 56
50 See 1980 CONN. PUB. ACTS 80-158, § 3; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19A (West
1976); 1979 OHIO LAWS 4113.23(A); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37, 3-5(a) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 103-13(5) (West Supp. 1983); S. 1967, Cal. Senate (1983); S.561, W. Va. Senate (1983).
51 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1983); 1980 CONN. PUB. ACT 80-158, § 3; D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 2, § 3105 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 631, 638 (1964); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423-501 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.750 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1321 (Purdon Supp. 1983); H.B. 141, Utah Cong. (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.13 (West
Supp. 1983).
52 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126.22 (1981).
53 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 652.750(b) (1981).
54 Id
55 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.62(1)(c) (Callaghan 1980).
56 Id at § 17.62(1)(c)(i) and (iv).
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Connecticut's statute forbids the disclosure of individually identifi-
able information contained in personnel files (or medical records) to one
not employed by or affiliated with the employer, absent the employee's
written consent. 5 7 An exception is made for information limited to em-
ployment dates, an employee's title or position, and wage or salary
data.58 Other exceptions include the disclosure of personnel information
pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 59
Maine's statute covering private-sector employees allows, in addi-
tion to the usual information, access to non-privileged medical records or
nurses' station notes and makes failure to comply with any of the statu-
tory provisions a civil penalty. 6° Oregon excludes from its definition of
"personnel records" confidential reports from other employers and those
records relating to an individual's conviction, arrest or investigation of
conduct constituting a violation of criminal law.6 ' The Oregon statute
also provides for civil and criminal penalties for its violation.
Similarly, Pennsylvania law does not include in its definition of
"personnel records" information relating to the investigation of a possi-
ble criminal offense, letters of reference, or documents prepared for civil,
criminal or grievance procedures or medical records.62 In addition,
records available to an employee under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
are excluded. The term "employee" does not, in Pennsylvania, encom-
pass an applicant for employment. 63 Wisconsin law allows an employee
to designate in writing a union representative to perform the inspection
of personnel records where the employee is involved in grievance pro-
ceedings, allows for personnel record correction by an employee, and ex-
cludes access to information of a personal nature about a person other
than the employee if disclosure would constitute "a clearly unwarranted
invasion of the other person's privacy." 64
The most comprehensive law dealing with both the issues of access
to information by employees and disclosure of data by employers to third
parties is the so-called "Bullard-Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act"
of Michigan.65 In addition to incorporating most, if not all, of the vari-
ous features of the laws discussed above, Michigan's law excludes from its
definition of "personnel records" those records maintained by educa-
tional institutions66 and indicates that they are to be considered educa-
tional records under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
57 1980 CONN. PUB. ACTS 80-158, § 3.
5 8 Id
59 Id.
6 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 638 (1964).
61 OR. REV. STAT. § 652.750 (1981).
62 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1321 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
63 Id.
64 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.13(3) (West Supp. 1983).
65 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.62 (Callaghan 1980).
66 Id. § 17.62(1)(c)(vii).
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1974.67
Beyond this, Michigan specifically precludes an employer from di-
vulging a disciplinary report, reprimand letter, or other disciplinary ac-
tion to third parties in the absence of an employee's consent. 68 It also
forbids the keeping of records concerning an employee's associations,
political activities, publications, or communications of non-employment
activities. Moreover, the Michigan law deals with records of employer
investigations of criminal activity by an employee when the activity may
result in loss or damage to an employer's property, as well as the records
of criminal justice agencies, as employers, when they are involved in the
investigation of employee criminal activity.69
D. State Laws Afecting Access to Arrest Record Information
A multiplicity of laws affect an employer's access to and reliance on
information concerning arrest records. Although the issue usually arises
in the context of a prospective employee's application for employment, it
could arise, as well, when an employer seeks information directly from a
criminal justice agency. Existing state laws may act as a barrier to the
obtaining of arrest record data by an employer. Specific state enact-
ments as well as state discrimination or fair employment laws should be
consulted.
L Specif* State Statutes
Statutes concerning access to arrest data should not be confused
with those concerning convictions. At least sixteen states have enacted
specific legislation dealing with access to arrest data.
California law prevents an employer, "whether a public agency or
private individual or corporation" from asking applicants for employ-
ment to disclose either information concerning arrest or detention which
did not result in conviction or information concerning referral to or par-
ticipation in any pre-trial or post-trial diversion program. 70 These same
strictures apply to an employer's use of such information in order to de-
termine any condition of employment, including hiring, promotion, ter-
mination or any training program. 7 1 The law does allow an employer to
seek arrest information, however, when a position involves regular access
to patients in a health facility or access to drugs and medication. 72 The
law also forbids law enforcement personnel from knowingly disclosing
that information. 73
67 Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, tit. V, § 513(a),
88 Stat. 571-74 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1982)).
68 Id. § 17.62(6).
69 Id § 17.62(8).
70 CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (West Supp. 1983).
71 Id
72 Id. § 432.7(b)(1) & (2).
73 Id § 432.7(0.
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Variations on the California approach occur in Connecticut, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah and Virginia. A
Maryland statute prevents an employer "in any application, interview or
otherwise" from requiring an applicant for employment to disclose infor-
mation concerning criminal charges which have been expunged and for-
bids an employer from discharging or refusing to hire a person for
refusing to divulge information concerning such charges.7 4 The statute
also instructs that an applicant need not, in answer to any question con-
cerning criminal charges that have not resulted in conviction, include a
reference or information on charges that have been expunged. 75
In a similar vein, Massachusetts requires that an employer include
the following statement on an employment application which seeks infor-
mation concerning prior arrests or convictions:
An applicant for employment with a sealed record on file with the com-
missioner of probation may answer 'no record' with respect to any in-
quiry herein relative to prior arrests, criminal court appearances or
convictions. In addition, any applicant for employment may answer 'no
record' with respect to any inquiry relative to prior arrests, court appear-
ances and adjudications in all cases of delinquency or as a child in need
of services which did not result in a complaint transferred to the superior
court for criminal prosecution.
76
Connecticut law is unique in that it requires that the portion of a
job application form which contains information concerning the arrest
record of a job applicant must not be available to any employee or mem-
ber of the company interviewing an applicant except members of the
personnel department, or the person in charge of employment in the ab-
sence of a personnel department. 77
New York law provides that upon the favorable termination of a
criminal action or proceeding against a person, he or she shall not be
required to divulge information pertaining to the arrest or prosecution,
except in certain circumstances. 78 Pennsylvania is unusual in that when-
ever an employer is in possession of information which is part of an appli-
cant's criminal history record, the data concerning arrests and
misdemeanor convictions may be considered by the employer only to the
extent to which it relates to the applicant's suitability for employment in
the position for which the individual has applied. 79 Further, the em-
ployer must notify an applicant if a decision not to hire is based in whole
or in part on information contained in the criminal history record.8 0
Utah allows employers to inquire about arrests and convictions, but
74 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 740 (1957 & Supp. 1983).
75 Id.
76 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 26, § 100A (West 1932).
77 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1972).
78 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.60 (McKinney 1916). While this provision does not spe-
cifically mention employers, it would seem to apply in the context we are discussing here.
79 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1925(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
80 Id. § 1925(c).
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only to the extent that they have not been expunged or sealed. Should
the employer ask about expunged or sealed arrests or convictions, a per-
son may answer as though the arrest or conviction did not occur.8 ' Vir-
ginia accords the same treatment to arrest data and an applicant's
prerogatives as does Maryland, except that there is no prohibition on an
employer's discharge of, or refusal to hire, the affected person.
8 2
Apart from regulation of an employer's requests concerning the ar-
rest data as they appear on applictions for employment, the District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio and
Tennessee have enacted pertinent legislation. The District of Columbia
requires that its Board of Commissioners require the keeping of arrest
books containing such information as date of arrest, name, address, date
of birth, color, birthplace, occupation and marital status of the arrestee,
offense charged, and disposition of the case.8 3 These records are open to
public inspection when not in actual use, and so, are available to
employers.
Hawaii, Minnesota and New Mexico forbid arrest records not fol-
lowed by a valid conviction, and certain conviction records, from being
used,84 distributed, or disseminated, by state employers in connection
with any application for public employment. Missouri provides that if a
person is arrested and not charged with an offense within thirty days, all
records pertaining thereto shall be closed to all persons except the ar-
rested person.8 5 If no conviction occurs within one year of the records'
closing, the records shall be expunged. 86
Maine's extensive law makes it clear that conviction data may be
disseminated "to any person for any purpose, 8s 7 and allows the disclo-
sure by a criminal justice agency of "any and all criminal history record
information in its possession which indicates the disposition of the arrest,
detention or formal charges." Ohio makes the publication of a fair and
impartial report of the arrest of any person privileged unless the publica-
tion was malicious.88 Tennessee, while excluding arrest history from
those records eligible for expunction, classifies them as confidential
records not open for inspection by members of the public. 89 Addition-
ally, Tenniessee classifies all investigative records of its bureau of criminal
identification as confidential. 9°
As can be seen from the above statutory survey, certain state laws
81 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-2(3) (1953).
82 VA. CODE § 19.2-392.4(A) (1983).
83 D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-134 (1981).
84 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 831-3.1 (1976 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.04 (West
1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (1978).
85 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.100 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
86 Id.
87 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 615 (1964).
88 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.05 (Page 1981).
89 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-4001 (1982).
90 Id.
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deal specifically with an employer's rights to have access to, and to util-
ize, arrest record data. Others deal with that right only by implication.
Apart from these explicit or implicit enactments, state laws on discrimi-
nation also play a role in an employer's ability to use arrest information.
2. Fair Employment Laws
As is true with specific state statutes governing the use of arrest data,
state laws barring various forms of discrimination often distinguish be-
tween the use of that information and the use of records of conviction.
Thus, statutes in Florida, Kentucky and New York forbid discrimination
by an employer who looks to conviction records. 9 '
For example, New York's law, which applies to both public and pri-
vate employers, disallows the denial of employment because of the con-
viction of one or more criminal offenses or because of the finding of a
lack of "good moral character" based upon a conviction of a criminal
offense unless (1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the
previous criminal offenses and the specific employment sought, or (2) the
granting of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to prop-
erty or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general pub-
lic.9 2 The New York statute enumerates factors to be considered
concerning a previous criminal conviction and provides for a written
statement by the employer upon denial of employment. 93 It also re-
quires that an employer give consideration to "a certificate of relief from
disabilities or a certificate of good conduct issued to the applicant,"
which certificate creates a presumption of rehabilitation with respect to
the offense(s) specified therein.9 4
The issue of an employer's consideration of arrest records is ad-
dressed by the discrimination laws of at least five states: Hawaii, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as the District of
Columbia.9 5
Additional sources which should be checked by employers wishing
to ascertain the extent of their ability to obtain and utilize arrest record
data are the advisory guidelines or regulations issued by various'state
agencies concerned with administering the state's fair employment dr'
civil rights law. New Hampshire, for example, has no statutory prohibi-
tion on the use of arrest records, but has dealt with this issue in a publica-
tion called "Pre-employment Inquiries."'96 Guidelines such as this set out
91 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01 1(1)(a) (Harrison's 1978 & Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 335B.010(4) (Bobbs-Merrill 1983); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 751 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
92 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
93 Id § 753.
94 Id § 753(2).
95 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-1(6) (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 8539(e) and ch. 68, § 2-
105 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9) (West 1976); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 37.2205(a) (West 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2276 (1981).
96 See New Hampshire: Pre-Employment Inquiries, 8A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 445; 2501
(effective Nov. 26, 1982), for the guidelines.
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examples of questions asked of prospective employees which the agency
considers illegal, such as questions concerning arrest. Specifically, the
guidelines indicate that it is considered potentially discriminatory to in-
quire about the number and kinds of arrests of a job applicant, although
it is permissible to inquire about the numbers and kinds of convictions
within the past five years. 97
The laws concerning an employer's access to and use of arrest data
intertwine in many cases with that of conviction information and stem
from a number of sources. An employer should at least be aware of spe-
cific laws concerning arrest information, discrimination laws and regula-
tions, and generalized state laws concerning privacy, and credit reporting
agencies.
E M'scellaneous State Laws Affecting Privacy
A potpourri of additional types of state laws may at least tangen-
tially affect an employer's analysis of privacy in the workplace. A
number of these will be briefly examined, in order to point out other
avenues of potential concern.
Z Blacklisting
While New Hampshire has no statute prohibiting an employer from
blacklisting an employee, an early decision of the New Hampshire
courts, Huskie v. Grtftm,98 states that an employee can recover damages
from a former employer who attempted to prevent the employee's subse-
quent employment, where the attempt is found to be malicious, fraudu-
lent representation, or motivated by self-interest without reasonable
cause. The court held that "a statement of truth, made for the sole pur-
pose of damaging the plaintiff [employee] by causing a third party [pro-
spective employer] to refuse to further deal with the plaintiff, is
actionable if damages ensue." 99
2. Employment Applications
An employer should ascertain whether state law prevents it from
asking certain questions, apart from those with discriminatory or arrest
record implications. Maryland statutory law precludes an employer
from asking an applicant to answer any questions, whether oral or writ-
ten, pertaining to any physical, psychological or psychiatric illness, disa-
bility, handicap or treatment which does not bear a "direct, material and
timely relationship" to the applicant's fitness or capacity to perform
properly the responsibilities of the desired position. 'o Similarly, Massa-
chusetts law provides that no employment application may ask about
97 Id
98 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909).
99 Id. at 348, 74 A. at 597.
100 MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95A (1957).
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mental hospitalization where the person has been discharged and is no
longer under treatment.' 0 ' Hiring discrimination under this provision is
illegal against an applicant who fails to answer such an inquiry, and who
can produce a psychiatrist's letter of mental competency to do the job,
unless a bona fide occupational qualification exists.'
0 2
3. Fingerprinting
In New York, no person may be fingerprinted as a condition of se-
curing or of continuing employment, unless otherwise allowed by law. '
0 3
Employers which are public galleries of art, or museums, or legally incor-
porated hospitals or medical colleges affiliated with such hospitals may,
however, require fingerprinting as a condition of employment.'
0 4
4. Drivers' Records
Upon the written request of an employer or prospective employer,
the Commission of the Division of Motor Vehicles in Virginia, under
that state's law, must provide an abstract of an individual's operating
record, showing all convictions, accidents, license suspensions or revoca-
tions and any type of license possessed by an individual, so long as the
person's position or the position he is being considered for involves the
operation of a motor vehicle.10 5
5. Common Law Przvacy Codication
The Fair Employment Law of New Hampshire provides that it shall
be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to print, circu-
late, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or
publication in connection with employment which expresses, directly or
indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to race, sex,
age, religious creed, color, national origin, marital status, or physical or
mental handicap. 06 This statute appears to incorporate the publication
aspects of the common law tort of public disclosure of private facts in the
context of discrimination law.
V. Arbitral Precedent and Privacy
The observation has been made that the reason there exists a rela-
tive dearth of common law invasion of privacy suits involving the em-
ployee-employer relationship may be because conflicts over the issue
arise and are settled in the arbitral arena. ' 0 7 At least one arbitrator has
101 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9A) (West 1932 & Supp. 1983).
102 Id.
103 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-a (McKinney 1916 & Supp. 1982-1983).
104 Id.
105 VA. CODE § 46.1-31(6) (1980).
106 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1966 & Supp. 1981).
107 Note, The ubficty Requirement and the Employee's Right to Privacy, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 360
(1979).
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collated decisions and analyzed the requirement that employees supply
personal information as it relates to their jobs.108 This author notes that
the general recognition that the employer may exercise reasonable mana-
gerial rights of supervision, even though this may not be set forth specifi-
cally in the collective bargaining agreement, generally allows requests for
personal information where they are not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Thus, "management has been found to be justified in imposing rea-
sonable and necessary requirements and restrictions for the proper direc-
tion of the working forces and the management of business."'1 9 As such,
applicants for employment are frequently required to fill out detailed
application forms seeking information concerning education, experience,
and general personal and working background. One arbitrator has
found, for example, that "there is no doubt that questions relating to
past criminal activity are valid in applications for employment," ' 10 al-
though he further observed that a trend exists whereby length of service
to a company, in cases where disclosure of the criminal history has not
occurred, reduces the significance of the omission. The right to seek ar-
rest record information is implicit in other arbitral decisions."' Simi-
larly, arbitrators have approved the practice of an employer's checking
with an applicant's former employers shown on application.' 1
2
Apart from the application form itself, employers have generally
been granted wide latitude to seek personal information, not necessarily
restricted to the informational privacy aspects of an employee's work life.
Thus, the courts have upheld such far ranging practices as requiring an
employee to submit to a physical examination upon his return to
work,11 3 hiring private checkers to observe workers in order to determine
if they are adequately performing their jobs, 1 4 opening employees' lock-
ers to search for stolen property, 115 opening an employee's briefcase for
inspection, 116 and searching an employee's lunch box for liquor.' 17
It has been noted that alleged invasions of an employee's privacy
have sometimes been treated as an infringement upon his or her dignity
or peace of mind.i 8 Thus, alleged violations run a wide gamut of issues.
108 Scheiber, Tests and Questionnaires in the Labor-Management Relationshitp, 20 LAB. L.J. 695
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Labor-Management Relationship].
109 Id at 695-696.
110 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 66 LA 96, 97 (1976) (LeWinter 1980).
111 See, e.g., Huntington Alloys, Inc., 74 LA 176, 178 (1980) (Katy, Arb.) (falsification of
application concerning arrest record gave employer right to discharge employee for just cause);
Kaiser Steel Corp., 64 LA 194, 195 (1975) (Roberts, Arb.) (employer not justified in discharging
employee for responding "No" to a question on an employment application asking if employee
had ever been convicted of a crime, where employee was convicted of a misdemeanor).
112 Atlanta Gas Light, 65 LA 1084, 1088 (1975) (Lipsitz, Arb.).
"13 Chatfield Paper Corp. 46 LA 530 (1966) (McIntosh, Arb.).
114 Kroger Co., 40 LA 316 (1963) (Reid, Arb.).
115 International Nickel Co., 50 LA 65 (1967) (Shister, Arb.).
116 Friedrich Refrigerators, Inc., 39 LA 934 (1962) (Williams, Arb.).
117 Freuhauf Corp., 49 LA 89 (1967) (Daugherty, Arb.).
118 See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, 727-28 (3d ed.
1976).
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For example, where an employer required that an employee disclose an
unlisted phone number, no invasion of the employee's right of privacy
was found. 19 The arbitral approach to the privacy issue has been sum-
marized as follows:
In the conflict between the personal rights of the employees and man-
agement's right to impinge on the worker's right of complete privacy,
management is supported in a number of cases which encompass diverse
facets of alleged intrusions on rights of privacy.
A significant conclusion to be drawn from these decisions is that the em-
ployer is permitted by law and by contract to make such rules and regu-
lations as are not inconsistent with the parties' collective bargaining
agreement, and which are reasonably necessary for smooth, efficient con-
duct of the business - even though at times they may impinge on the
employee's personal privacy.12 0
The concern over privacy has surfaced in recent years in the context
of questionnaires which employees or prospective employees have been
asked to fill out, and which are designed to ascertain conflicts of interest.
Especially when no collective bargaining agreement addresses this issue,
it is vigorously contended that to permit such a requirement would pave
the way for many other unilaterally imposed obligations on an employee
which were never contemplated by the parties during negotiations. This
issue has been thoroughly examined by one arbitrator1 2' who, when con-
fronted with the issue of an employer's requirement that members of its
news staff fill out a questionnaire regarding their financial interests,
viewed the privacy right involved as follows:
The litmus test of a careful examination makes it clear that the right of
privacy is, at best, a limited right which, in general, protects the individ-
ual from having his name, picture, actions and statements commercially
made public and exploited without his consent. This right, however,
only safeguards him from the publication of his private statements or
actions. 122
The arbitrator apparently felt that common law concepts of privacy
were applicable in the arbitral forum as well. He held that the require-
ment was a reasonable one and that it did not infringe upon an em-
ployee's privacy rights since no public disclosure of private facts occurred
and the information was obtained for the legitimate and limited business
reason of eliminating bias in news reporting. 123
Despite the increasingly prominent role that privacy concerns play
in the workday environment, collective bargaining agreements do not
appear to deal, to any great extent, with this issue. In light of the com-
plexity of various laws governing informational as well as other aspects of
privacy, and in light of the ramifications they may have for all concerned
with obtaining access to and use of information which may be classified
119 Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 52 LA 755, 758 (1969) (Seinsheimer, Arb.).
120 Labor-Management Relationship, supra note 58, at 697.
121 Id at 697-702.
122 National Broadcasting Co., 53 LA 312, 317 (1969) (Scheiber, Arb.).
123 Id. at 319.
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as personal or private, privacy issues would seem to be a fruitful area for
negotiation at the bargaining table.
VI. Assessment of the Status of the Privacy Right
The Supreme Court has recently stated that "The sensitivity of any
human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on
his or her basic competence is sufficiently well known to be an appropri-
ate subject for judicial notice."' 124 Employers have been chided for fail-
ing to protect confidential information, for improperly using information
to make personnel decisions, and for exchanging records among them-
selves. A recent report of the House Labor Subcommittee on Labor-
Management Relations states that "Employers remain virtually un-
checked in their ability to demand information from applicants" and
that "the legal restrictions on the information an employer can acquire
from secondary sources are limited."'' 25
Despite the views expressed in some quarters that employers are in-
sensitive to the need for the safeguarding of data concerning their em-
ployees, a number of them have taken steps to guarantee that
information will not be misused.'2 6 The current status of privacy in the
workplace has recently been described as follows:
The long-running public debate over the rights and rules governing em-
ployee privacy has lately taken the shape of a baffling paradox. More
insistently than ever, the advocates dedicated to guarding this privacy
are arguing the need for tougher action and legislation to support their
cause. Yet at the same time, a great many business leaders are respond-
ing with equal conviction - and some bewilderment - that they can-
not comprehend such agitation over what appears to them a cause
already largely won. The consequent paradox turns on the fact that
both sides in this dispute may, essentially, be quite right.
12 7
Alan F. Westin, the author of the above quotation, points to an
evolution in the thinking of a number of larger corportions which have
come to feel that the opening of personnel files - which these companies
do voluntarily - has helped to sharpen management judgment. 128 Ad-
ditionally, they have determined that truly fair information practices re-
quire an open process, whereby employees share as much as possible the
facts about how decisions affecting people are made.' 29 Third, they have
124 Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
125 HOUSE LABOR SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., PRESSURES IN TODAY'S WORKPLACE 47 (Subcomm. Print 1981).
126 For explications of the approaches to privacy protection taken by such companies as
IBM, Bank of America, and the Equitable Life Insurance Society, refer to IBM's Guidelines to
Employee Privacy, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 82, reprinted in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
THE CORPORATION, 214 (1980); A. Westin, A Profile of Bank of Ameri a's Privacy Experiene, INDI-
VIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION, 226 (1980); A. Westin, The Problem of Employee Privacy
Still Troubles Management, Individual Rights in the Corporation, 245 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Indi-
vidual Rights].
127 Id. at 245.
128 Id. at 251.
129 Id.
[VOL. 9
PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE
found that a clear definition of merit and demonstration of equitable
treatment vitally affect management's credibility.1 30 Fourth, they feel
that organizations must provide explicit mechanisms for fair procedure,
making clear what information is used to make decisions. 131 Finally, all
company policies must consider every employee's need for self-expression
and individual dignity. "Without such a spirit animating management,
all privacy policies are mere exercises in bureaucracy, where the letter
killeth."132
Westin concludes that such principles do not mean there is one per-
fect set of privacy policies and procedures appropriate for every com-
pany. Each business, with its own set of requirements and traditions,
must design its own "fair practices" because, as he points out, it is the
overall spirit of a privacy program, and not its details, which invests per-
sonnel administration with perceptiveness and sensitivity. 133 From this
philosophy flows Westin's rejection of any "full code" model of privacy
regulation, either federal or state, to specify the appropriate collection
and use of employment information or personal data dissemination.
Such a rigid approach, in his view, could not only warp responsible em-
ployment policies, but might also poorly serve employee interests, with
management complying with the letter of regulation, but not moving
any closer to a "humanistic style of corporate performance."'' 3 4
Yet, because he does not see purely voluntary procedures as suffi-
cient, Westin argues for a "minimum rights" legislative approach, with
remedies by individual lawsuit. 135 Such an approach would give em-
ployees the right to examine their personnel data, much as Michigan law
currently does. 136 It would also specify rules for release of information
outside the firm, as does Michigan. Apart from outlawing certain prac-
tices completely, such as the use of polygraphs, and Psychological Stress
Evaluators in hiring, this approach would not attempt to otherwise enu-
merate or regulate what types of information to collect for effective per-
sonnel administration. Westin concludes that:
Such an approach reserves for voluntary action those areas where differ-
ences of function, organization, and style matter most in the selection of
personnel. But it also makes open and clear - to employee and public
alike - the facts on just what is being collected by employers and how it
is being used. This would allow American society to decide - three or
five years from now - whether business's response has been good
enough or whether additional laws may be needed. And this seems both
a just balance and a fair test. 13 7
Thus, employers would look not to an ever-increasing level of regulatory
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id at 252.
136 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
137 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, supra note 75, at 252.
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complexity, but to good personnel administration techniques within the
parameters of legislation which currently exists and which gives them
broad scope.
VII. Conclusion
A Uniform Information Practices Code, which seeks to establish a
consistent method with access to the governmental records of various
state agencies throughout the United States, has already beeen formu-
lated.'38 In a similar vein, uniform legislation which would define
for private sector employers and employees the basic operating prin-
ciples upon which they may depend should also be articulated and
promulgated.
As the above review of laws regulating the collection, maintenance,
use and dissemination of information indicates, it is a herculean task for
any employer to stay abreast of the numerous laws which affect informa-
tional privacy on both the federal and state level, and to sort out whether
those laws have any applicability to the employer's business. Add to this
responsibility the need for employers engaged in multi-state operations to
determine the implications of not only a single state's laws, but also other
states' possibly conflicting enactments and the matrix of employer
responsibility within the privacy law area becomes unwieldly, expen-
sive, time-consuming and formidable at the least. At the most, it is
unworkable.
A "Uniform Privacy Act" governing informational privacy in the
private sector would serve to set the parameters for a consistent, depend-
able policy of information use and dissemination. Such a policy would
be to an employer's advantage because it could incorporate, in the form
of a limited state law, those aspects of currently existing legislation which
safeguard the interests of both employers and employees, eliminate those
features which are duplicative or overreaching, and deal with the funda-
mental issues upon which a sound approach should be built in a uniform
manner. Such an act would enable employers to operate with a mini-
mum of confusion and a maximum of compliance.
A policy adopted by the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany on January 1, 1980, titled "Your Private Records," demonstrates
an enlightened approach to the privacy issue and can serve as the frame-
work for legislation which would strike the balance between fair treat-
ment of employees and efficient utilization of information by employers.
The highlights of American Telephone and Telegraph Company's policy
state that:
1. Personal information about employees will be kept accurate, com-
plete, relevant, and up-to-date and, when feasible, obtained directly
from the employees.
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2. The Company will collect and retain personal information about
employees only for valid business, regulatory or legal reasons.
3. Company records containing personal information about employees
will be held in confidence and properly safeguarded. Access to such
information will be limited to those who need the information to
perform their jobs (e.g., a payroll representative).
4. Employees will be informed periodically through appropriate em-
ployee media of the kinds of personal information maintained about
them in Company records.
5. Employees will be given reasonable opportunity to examine their
records and propose corrections, additions, deletions or changes to
them. Because of its confidential nature, a very limited amount of
personal information will generally not be made available for em-
ployee examination (e.g., certain personnel planning information).
6. The Company will not disclose personal information about employ-
ees to anyone outside the Bell System except under very limited con-
ditions. For example, personal information may be released if an
employee gives permission in writing to do so; or in order for the
Company to comply with legal requirements, valid legal process
(e.g., a court order or subpoena), or government agency investi-
gations."
The policy then goes on to discuss the correction and use of personal
information, specific records that the Company needs and keeps, access
to records, records not available for examination by employees, disclo-
sure of personal information, and medical information.
A "Uniform Privacy Act," which might encompass some of the ap-
proaches and areas of concern embraced by the American Telegraph and
Telephone Company Policy, specifically delineating when disclosure of
personal information will and will not occur,' 3 9 could be formulated and
enacted in order to put both employees and employers on notice that
employees will be treated equitably and sensitively, while employers will
be allowed to gather and utilize that information which is essential to
their operations.
Until that occurs, however, it will be necessary for counsel both
proactively and in the context of potential litigation to sift through the
various state and federal laws affecting their employer clients to assure
compliance and uncover both liabilities and defenses. The authors of
this article only hope that it has provided some guidance to those em-
barking on such a searching journey.
139 Disclosure provisions should deal with limitations on disclosure to the public, to govern-
ment agencies, and to the employee involved; what constitutes clearly unwarranted invasions of
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nance of information; correction and amendment of that information; disclosure of information
for research purposes; and civil remedies and/or criminal penalties.
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